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STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE 
is an appeal an 
Commissioners R. D. Maynard, Chairman, and Thomas E. Limbaugh, and the Honorable 
Douglas A. Donohue, Referee with the Idaho Industrial Commission, concluding that 
Claimant is not entitled to medical care benefits after August 9, 2007, the date she was 
determined by the Referee to be her date of medical stability, related to her October 30, 
2005, industrial accident and injury. 
The background of this case can be taken partially from page 2 of the Referee's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation (hereinafter "Decision"). 
The parties agree that Claimant/Appellant, Channel (Blacker) Rish, (hereinafter 
"Claimant") suffered a compensable accident at work on October 30, 2005. 
On the above accident date, Claimant slipped on a floor mat and twisted her right 
knee. At page of the Referee's Decision, paragraph 128, the Referee concluded: 
"She suffered, at most, a minor sprain. However, extensive medical treatment, 
including three arthroscopic surgeries and several injections have produced a harmful 
result. Medical opinions persuasively suggest that some pain may be the result of 
scarring from the surgeries. " 
The Referee concluded that the Claimant reached MMI as of August 9, 2007, 
when Dr. Casey Huntsman, who had performed all three arthroscopic surgeries, opined 
Claimant to be at MMI. (See Decision, par. 104) At paragraph 107 of the Decision, the 
Referee stated, "The preponderance of evidence shows physicians who treated Claimant 
after August 9, 2007, merely provided, at best, palliative treatment which subjectively, 
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decreased Claimant's complaints of pain but did not provide any 
measures or restore a measureable 
and 
9, 2007, as being "reasonable." 
Dr. Huntsman's chart note for August 9, 2007, states, under the heading 
"RECOMMENDATIONS": "I discussed the diagnosis with the patient. We discussed 
treatment options. She definitely needs to see Dr. Zoe for continued pain management. I 
do believe from my standpoint she has reached maximum medical improvement." 
( emphasis added) 
Claimant contends that the Commission's decision to cut off any and all of 
Claimant's medical treatment subsequent to August 9, 2007, was unreasonable and is not 
based on substantial and competent evidence. Additionally, the Commission misapplied 
the law in deciding whether or not Claimant's medical treatment after August 7, 2009, 
was reasonable. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
On February 26,2010, Claimant filed a complaint with the Industrial 
Commission. The matter went to hearing, which was held on August 26, 2014. The 
Commission's Decision was issued on September 23, 2105. This appeal followed. 
3. Statement of Facts: 
As stated above, it is undisputed that, on October 30, 2005, the Claimant suffered 
a compensable accident at work as a clerk at The Home Depot. At that time the Claimant 
slipped on a floor mat and twisted her right knee. Claimant does not dispute the 
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Referee's finding expressed at page 32 the Decision, paragraph 128, where the Referee 
at a 
including three arthroscopic surgeries and several injections have produced a harmful 
result. Medical opinions persuasively suggest that some pain may be the result of 
scarring from the surgeries. " 
As stated above, on August 9, 2007, three months after her last right knee 
arthroscopy with lateral release, her treating physician and surgeon, Dr. Casey Huntsman, 
declared her to be at MMI. Despite the fact that Claimant was at MMI, Dr. Huntsman 
declared, "She definitely needs to see Dr. Zoe for continued pain management." (See 
Claimant's Exhibit #3, page 23) 
By letter to the Surety dated October 4, 2007, Dr. Huntsman stated: 
"I am writing this letter to let you know where I am at concerning Channel 
Rish and her right knee problem. She is now 4 Yz months out from her 
lateral release. She really does not feel like it has helped. She has seen 
Dr. Zoe who is working on some pain management issues which I think 
would be helpful for her. At this point in time, I recommend an 
independent medical evaluation to determine what her true functional 
status should be. I believe she is definitely in pain but there is nothing 
mechanical that can be done surgically to make this better. I have told 
her I do not think any further surgery is needed and she needs to continue 
working on pain coping and pain management issues. Please contact me 
if you have any questions or concerns about her situation." (Claimant's 
Exhibit 3, p. 25, emphasis added) 
In his chart note of that day - October 4, 2007 - Dr. Huntsman stated: 
"I am glad she has pursued treatment with Dr. Zoe. Dr. Zoe is looking at 
all her options. At this point in time, I think it would be good for her to 
have an independent medical evaluation to determine what her functional 
status should be at this point. She definitely needs continued pain 
management. I definitely do not think any more surgery would be 
beneficial for " (Claimant's Exhibit 3, 26, emphasis added) 
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Although she subsequently was seen by several IME and 
at 1 
was in the best position to evaluate the Claimant at the most relevant times. He 
had performed the surgeries and actually observed Claimant's internal knee 
condition. His opinion that Claimant was at MMI as of August 9, 2007, carries 
the most weight" 
Obviously the question is, if the Commission relies most heavily on Dr. 
Huntsman's opinions, why is no treatment after August 9, 2007, approved, even 
though Dr. Huntsman unequivocally prescribes follow up pain management? 
At paragraph 112, the Decision states, "Considering the totality of facts 
and circumstances, Claimant's condition, related to the 2005 industrial accident 
reached MMI as of August 7, 2007. Medical care benefits thereafter were merely 
palliative and failed to restore function to any useful degree." 
As such, the Commission ordered that any medical benefits provided 
Claimant after August 7, 2007, were unreasonable. 
Ill 
Ill 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE COMMISSION APPLY THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD 
TO DETERMINE "REASONABLENESS" OF CLAIMANT'S 
MEDICAL TREATMENT AFTER AUGUST 7, 2007? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Attorney's fees are requested per LC. §72-804. 
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LEGAL SUMMARY 
is to 
are to Loving 
and 1'.J.ore Inc. 133 Idaho 572, 573, 990 P.2d 738 (citations omitted). The humane 
purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. 
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87,910 P.2d 759 (1996). The Act is to be construed broadly to 
bring as many workers within its coverage as possible and the Act should be construed 
liberally in order to effectuate its beneficent purposes. Yount v. Boundary County, 118 
Idaho 307, 796 P.2d 516 (1990). 
When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, the Court exercises free 
review over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. LC. §72-
732; Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004). 
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 
Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). 
LC. §72-432(1) provides that an employer must provide for an injured employee 
such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital 
services, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the 
employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation of an 
occupational disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. 
LC. §72-432(1) obligates the employer to provide treatment, if the employee's 
physician requires the treatment and if the treatment is reasonable. It is for the physician, 
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not the Commission, to decide whether the treatment is required. The only review the 
IS treatment was 
An employer must pay 
required by the physician, period. [It] does not require that the claimant make gradual 
improvement from the treatment received. Whether the claimant's condition gradually 
improved should not be determinative of whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is 
conceivable that a course of treatment seemed necessary at the time the doctor prescribed 
it, even though a patient unfortunately did not improve. The reasonableness of a doctor's 
determination that treatment is indicated should be measured at the time the doctor 
prescribes treatment, not by "armchair doctoring" afterwards with the benefit of 
hindsight. Chavez v. Stokes, 353 P.3d 414 (Idaho) (2015), approvingly quoting Justice 
Bistline's specially concurring and dissenting opinion from Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet 
& Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993). 
Once a claimant is medically stable, he or she is no longer in a period of recovery, 
and total temporary disability benefits cease. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 
Idaho 579,586, 38 P.3d 617, 624 (2001). 
ARGUMENT 
Claimant contends the Commission's Decision is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and the Referee used the wrong legal standard in deciding that 
Claimant's medical care after August 9, 2007, was not reasonable, necessary or related to 
Claimant's industrial accident on October 30, 2005. 
Ill 
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1. As to medical care benefits, that Claimant attained MMI on August 9, 
2007, is irrelevant 
on 
date Dr. Casey Huntsman deemed her at MMI and awarded her a PPI rating. 
Although MMI stops the "period of recovery" which ends a claimant's right to 
disability income benefits, it is irrelevant as to a claimant's right to medical care benefits. 
LC. §72-432(1) requires an employer to pay medical benefits immediately after an injury 
and "for a reasonable time thereafter." 
That the Commission chose to deny benefits from that date forward is not 
supported by substantial or competent evidence. 
2. The Commission applied the wrong legal standard to determine 
"reasonableness" of Claimant's medical treatment after August 9, 2007. 
As stated above, it is worth repeating that the Referee stated, at paragraph 108 of 
the Decision, "Dr. Huntsman was in the best position to evaluate the Claimant at the most 
relevant times. He had performed the surgeries and actually observed Claimant's internal 
knee condition. His opinion that Claimant was at MMI as of August 9, 2007, carries the 
most weight" 
Dr. Huntsman also saw the Claimant on October 4, 2007, for a post-surgery 
assessment - after the Referee concluded that no additional medical benefits should be 
awarded the Claimant. Dr. Huntsman commented, "She definitely needs continued pain 
management." (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 26) There are no opposing medical opinions 
that this visit was not reasonable, necessary and related to Claimant's right knee injury. 
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Dr. Huntsman last saw the Claimant on November 29, 2007. He noted the 
~,u,uu~u• was not from 
at Utah, 
All of Claimant's treating physicians clearly agree that she suffered from chronic 
knee pain subsequent to her accident at Home Depot. These include Dr. Huntsman, Dr. 
Zoe, Dr. Christensen, Dr. Bender, and Dr. Poston. 
Paragraph 112 of the Decision states: 
"Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, Claimant's condition, related 
to the 2005 industrial accident reached MMI as of August 7[sic], 2007. Medical care 
benefits thereafter were merely palliative and failed to restore function to any useful 
degree." (emphasis added) 
In paragraph 111, the Commission states: "Moreover, a significant amount of Dr. 
Poston's treatment included a spinal stimulator. The preponderance of evidence shows it 
failed to restore function in any objective way." ( emphasis added) 
In paragraph 106, the Referee wTites: "The preponderance of evidence fails to 
show an improvement in Claimant's condition between the dates of the two IME 
evaluations." ( emphasis added) 
In paragraph 107, the Commission states: "The preponderance of evidence shows 
physicians who treated Claimant after August 9, 2007, merely provided, at best, palliative 
treatment which subjectively, temporarily, decreased Claimant's complaints of pain but 
did not provide any curative measures or restore function in any measureable way." 
( emphasis added) 
In his Decision, paragraph 103, the Referee states: 
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"One factor among in determining whether post-recovery palliative care 
1S 
treatment 
Clearly the sole standard relied on by the Commission to decide the 
"reasonableness" of the Claimant's medical treatment after her injury was whether or not, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the treatment restored function. 
This misstates the most current law regarding "reasonableness" of treatment. It is 
worth repeating from the Chavez case, above, where Justice Bistline described the 
"appropriate view" of Sprague and the "reasonableness inquiry of Idaho Code section 72-
432(1)." He said: 
"Whether the claimant's condition gradually improved should not 
be determinative of whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is 
conceivable that a course of treatment seemed necessary at the time the 
doctor prescribed it, even though a patient unfortunately did not improve. 
The reasonableness of a doctor's determination that treatment is indicated 
should be measured at the time the doctor prescribes treatment, not by 
"armchair doctoring" afterwards with the benefit of hindsight." 
The IME doctors also agree that the Claimant suffered from chronic knee pain 
(mostly) secondary to the Home Depot accident. 
In his IME on January 9, 2008, Dr. Gussner opined, on page 6 of his report, that 
Claimant should undergo an evaluation by Dr. Burks at the University of Utah, just like 
Dr. Huntsman recommended. (See Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped page #00294) 
Without any medical advice to the contrary, the surety denied this referral. 
In his IME on January 10, 2008, Dr. Friedman opined that the Claimant suffered "an 
exacerbation of an [sic] preexisting condition based on the I 0/30/05 injury and its 
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subsequent treatment" He further stated, be placed an 
a 
would patient to maximize her function, treat 
depression, and provide substantial documentation regarding her ability to return to work 
at her previous employment." (Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped page 00301) At Joint 
Exhibit "L" bate stamped 00314, in a letter to the Surety dated February 07, 2008, Dr. 
Gussner clearly opined that he believed the Life Fit Chronic Pain program he 
recommended was due to the industrial accident, stating it was "due to surgical 
interventions for industrial injury." 
Without any medical opinion to the contrary, the Surety denied the second opinion 
with Dr. Burks which the doctors unanimously agreed on, and the Claimant was unable to 
attend the Life Fit Chronic Pain Management Program prescribed by Drs. Gussner and 
Friedman because the Surety refused to pay for day care for her children while she was 
gone. (H.T. p. 58, 1. 13, top. 59, I. 19)2 
With the knowledge and consent of the Surety, the Claimant continued to treat with 
Dr. Zoe primarily with opioid medications including Fentanyl and Lortab. (Claimant's 
Exhibit 6) 
1 Drs. Friedman and Gussner attempt to relate or apportion some of Claimant's chronic right knee pain to a 
preexisting condition based on remote medical records from Dr. Kay Christensen, Claimant's family 
physician from three doctor visits in 1994, 1995, and 1997, when she was only 15, 16 and 18 years old. 
There are no records of pre-existing right knee pain for at least 8 years prior to the October 20, 2005, 
industrial accident. The Referee recognized this and discounted the apportionment of the injury to prior 
years in paragraph 128 of the Decision, where he states as a finding of fact, "She suffered, at most, a minor 
sprain. However, extensive medical treatment, including three arthroscopic surgeries and several injections 
have produced a harmful result." 
2 In his Decision, par. 105, the Referee misunderstood the facts regarding the referral to Dr. Burks by Drs. 
Huntsman, Gussman and Friedman, and the Life Fit Program. The Referee concluded that the Claimant 
never saw Dr. Burks because of"insurmountable personal issues." This is not correct. The record is clear 
that the Claimant wanted to see Dr. Burks. The reason the Claimant never saw Dr. Burks was because the 
Surety denied it. Claimant was unable to attend the recommended Life Fit program because the Surety 
refused to pay for daycare and the Claimant could not leave her children for three weeks. (See H.T. p. 58, 
l.13,top.59,1.19) 
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Nearly a year later, on January 28, 2009, Claimant was again IME'd by Dr. Gussner. 
at least to 8, 1 addressed 
"probable right knee strain related to work injury of 10/30/2005." Other than 
recommending the Claimant tapering off and discontinuing opioid medications, Dr. 
Gussner had no other treatment recommendations at that time related to the 10/30/2005 
accident. (Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped 00313) 
At about the same time, i.e., January 28, 2009, at the request of the Surety, Claimant 
underwent a psychological evaluation with a Dr. Michael H. McClay, in Boise, as part of 
the Gussner physical IME. Interestingly, Dr. McClay found Claimant to be suffering 
from "the elements of a Chronic Pain Syndrome" but stated, "The patient needs to be out 
of the worker's compensation process as quickly as possible." (Joint Exhibit "M" bate 
stamped 00318) 
In April of 2009, the Surety cut off medical benefits to the Claimant. (H.T. p. 63, 11. 
5-6. 
The Claimant's treatments with Dr. Zoe abruptly ended May 1, of 2009, when her 
medical benefits were cut off. 
Thereafter Claimant was left to treat her painful symptoms on her own. (H. T. p. 61, 
11. 22-25) Nearly five months later, on September 8, 2009, the Claimant was seen by her 
family doctor, Dr. Kay Christensen, for right knee pain. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 8) Dr. 
Christensen diagnosed her as suffering from chronic knee pain, secondary to her 
industrial accident in 2005. In June of 2010, Dr. Christensen referred the Claimant to Dr. 
Joseph Liljenquist, who first saw her in July of 2010. (Claimant's Exhibit 9, p. 1) Dr. 
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On February 24, 2014, the Claimant submitted to another IME for the Surety when 
she was seen by Dr. Gary Walker. (Joint Exhibit N) Dr. Walker physically examined the 
Claimant and reviewed all of her medical records. To summarize, Dr. Walker concluded 
that "Her diagnosis is chronic right knee pain complaints following a work injury of 
10/30/2005. She does have a history of remote knee problems dating back to 1994. 
However, she has no interval history of problems for the following 11 years." (Joint 
Exhibit "N" bate stamped #00334) He further opined, "Her work injury on 10/30/2005 
resulted in a medial knee irtjury." At page 00335, he states, "There does seem to be a 
causal relationship between her 2005 injury and her current ongoing problems." 
Although he opined on page 00336 that the spinal cord stimulator was not very 
helpful, he expressly declared during his deposition that Dr. Poston's prescribing a spinal 
cord stimulator was reasonable. Dr. Walker stated, "Based on his statement on that one 
note of his exam findings and doing a trial and her getting some positive response of a 
trial, it seems at the time it was maybe a reasonable thing to do." (Deposition of Gary 
Walker, p. 44, 11. 8-11) 
The doctors are unanimous that the Claimant suffered from chronic right knee pain to 
one degree or another as a result of her industrial accident and subsequent surgeries. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Claimant's treatment over the years with narcotic 
medication management and even the spinal cord stimulator, was not particularly curative 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 12 
or permanently beneficial. However, that is not the standard to be used to determine if 
treatment 
As Justice Bistline wrote: 
"LC. §72-432(1) obligates the employer to provide treatment, if the 
employee's physician requires the treatment and if the treatment is 
reasonable. It is for the physician, not the Commission, to decide whether 
the treatment is required. The only review the Commission is entitled to 
make of the physician's decision is whether the treatment was reasonable. 
An employer must pay for the costs of reasonable medical treatment 
required by the physician, period. [It] does not require that the claimant 
make gradual improvement from the treatment received. Whether the 
claimant's condition gradually improved should not be determinative of 
whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is conceivable that a course 
of treatment seemed necessary at the time the doctor prescribed it, even 
though a patient unfortunately did not improve. The reasonableness of a 
doctor's determination that treatment is indicated should be measured at 
the time the doctor prescribes treatment, not by "armchair doctoring" 
afterwards with the benefit of hindsight." 
The Commission clearly judged the reasonableness of this Claimant's treatment by. 
the standard of whether or not, with the benefit of hindsight, the Claimant gradually 
improved, not as to whether or not it was reasonable under the circumstances at the time 
the physician prescribed it. 
Dr. Walker said it best in his deposition with respect to the prescribed spine 
stimulator when he opined, "Based on his statement on that one note of his exam findings 
and doing a trial and her getting some positive response of a trial, it seems at the time it 
was maybe a reasonable thing to do." In other words, at the time he prescribed the spine 
stimulator, based on what he observed, it was reasonable treatment under the 
circumstances, regardless of whether or not the treatment was ultimately successful. 
Ill 
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ATTORNEY'S 
event 
or to an employee. case 
clearly medical benefits were unreasonably denied to one degree or another. This is best 
exemplified with respect to the referral of the Claimant by Dr. Huntsman to Dr. Burks at 
the University of Utah. Drs. Gussman and Friedman concurred in the referral, but the 
exam was denied by the surety with no supporting medical opinion. 
Claimant contends her medical care has been unreasonably denied and she should 
be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee in the event she is the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding that Claimant's medical treatment in this case was reasonable, the 
Commission wrongfully substituted its opinion in the place of the Claimant's treating 
physicians and the medical professionals. Instead of evaluating whether the treatment 
was reasonable at the time of treatment, given the Claimants presentation and symptoms 
at that time, the Commission looked to whether or not, with the benefit of hindsight, the 
treatment was successful - or "restored function." 
Chronic pain ( and arguably Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome or CRPS as several 
doctors diagnosed the Claimant as suffering from) is difficult to diagnose and treat. Not 
all treatments are successful. However, looking at this case from the physicians point of 
view, at the time of treatment and without "armchair doctoring" the Claimant's 
prescribed medical care was clearly reasonable. 
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The Commission relied on the 
Respectfully, 
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standard to come to 
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